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Capital structure is identified as one of focal facet in corporate finance branch of learning.  
It provides comprehension on how firms choose to finance their operations and expansion.  
The objective of this study is to explore the determinants of capital structure of Malaysian 
public  listed  companies.    The  period  of  2001-2006  was  selected  in  this  study,  which 
reflected the post Asian financial crisis period. Firm’s financial characteristics consist of 
size, growth, profitability, liquidity and ability to service debt. Family ownership which was 
identified as a unique feature in the Malaysian corporate sector was used to measure the 
effect of corporate governance in capital structure decision. Using panel data approach, 
this study infers that the role of ownership structure in the form of family ownership though 
is  not  significantly  related  to  capital  structure,  its  inclusion  in  the  empirical  equation 
changes  the  significance  of  other  variables.  Except  for  growth,  all  other  financial 
characteristics have significant relationships with capital structure. 
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Capital structure, one of the most studied aspects in modern corporate finance school of 
thought, is an important decision for management to ensure the financial health of firm to 
be  in  good  condition.  The  information  on  capital  structure  is  essential  for  every 
stakeholders  of  a  firm  to  make  their  decisions  pertaining  to  the  firm.  Suitable  capital 
structure is not only imperative for maximization of interest of every stakeholders of an 
organization, but also crucial for the organization to compete effectively and efficiently in 
its  operating  environment  (Simerly  &  Li,  1999).  Fallacious  choice  of  capital  structure 
would not only lead to its financial distress, but also ultimately drag the organization into 
insolvency (Eriotis et al., 2007). Studying firm’s capital structure is important as it plays 
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important role in creating value for the firm via the effect of tax, information asymmetry, 
and agency cost (Tang & Jang, 2007). Besides that, financial theory also has been used by 
firms to choose the best composition of capital structure that enhances the firms’ value 
(Eriotis et al., 2007). Therefore, study on capital structure would provide valuable insights 
on how strategic decision of firms in implementing investments would affect its value, 
which in return, used to determine its position in the market.   
Modigliani and Miller (1958) initiated the most significant study on this topic, which was 
followed with various studies that have been conducted in diverse dimensions of capital 
structure.  Despite  its  theoretical  appeal  and  vast  exploration,  researchers  in  financial 
management have not achieved consensus on capital structure and its optimality.  It was 
only the ways to achieve short-term capital structure objective were able to be identified in 
most of these studies (Simerly & Li, 1999).  It was pointed out that there is clear evidence 
of lack of consensus in identifying other determinants of capital structure (Delcoure, 2007).  
Fast advancement of agency theory with emphasis on bankruptcy costs and agency cost has 
contributed the argument that corporate governance has important role in capital structure 
(Seifert & Gonenc, 2008).  Among newly identified determinants that influence capital 
structure, corporate governance has been identified as one of decisive factor that affects 
firm’s capital structure decision (Delcoure, 2007). For this purpose, ownership structure is 
commonly used as proxy for corporate governance (Booth et al., 2001; Zou & Xiao, 2006).   
Prior to 1997 financial crisis, Malaysian firms were noted to be highly leveraged in view of 
their  close  relationship  with  local  banking  and  financial  institutions  where  bank-based 
borrowings  were  dominating  the  capital  structure  of  these  firms  (Tam  and  Tan,  2007). 
Hence, capital structure of most of Malaysian firms was more aligned to debt financing as 
options of equity financing were very much less considered. This showed owner of the 
firms  were  making investment decision based on connections and links  with the banks 
(Suto, 2003). This relates to weak path in corporate governance practices among Malaysian 
firms.  Besides  high  risk  capital  structure,  this  factor  also  contributed  to  bad  corporate 
investment decisions, rapid diversification and risky financing practices (Samad, 2004). For 
example, in November 1997, United Engineers Malaysia (a government-linked corporation) 
acquired 32.6% of its financially troubled holding company, Renong, at a premium price 
that was deemed as an act of bailout which suggest weak corporate governance practices 
(Mitton, 2002).  
After nearly ten years of the Asian financial crisis, the affected countries have rebound and 
back  on  track  with  decent  economy  fundamentals.  Post-crisis  period  exhibited  better 
corporate governance policies implemented by the authorities to ensure firms choose best 
source of financing (Wei & Zhang, 2008). Hence, this study would enable to highlight the 
post crisis capital structure decision especially with the implementation of new corporate 
governance  practices.  Uniqueness  of  this  study  would  be  the  enclosure  of  corporate 
governance link in the form of family ownership besides the usual financial characteristics 
variables. This would provide additional insight on how family ownership as prominent 
feature of the Malaysian corporate ownership affects the capital structure decisions.     Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 14, Issue 1, 2011 
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1.   Review of Literature 
1.1 Theory of Capital Structure 
An essential matter in corporate finance involves understanding how firms choose their 
financing choices and it is apparent that there is no consensus on theories that explains a 
firm's perfect capital structure (Seifert  & Gonenc, 2008).  Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
initiated  the  first  study  on  capital  structure  which  concludes  that  capital  structure  is 
immaterial  in  a  corporate  world  without  taxes,  transaction  costs  or  other  market 
imperfections.  As  theory  by  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958)  lack  of  practicality  in  its 
assumptions,  the  next  generation  of  researchers  explored  into  meticulous  conception  of 
capital structure that made possible to emergence of other prominent theories in capital 
structure.  
1.1.1 Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
This pioneer study was designed by Modigliani and Miller (1958) on assumption that there 
is existence of market perfection in capital market.  Therefore, the market operates without 
transaction costs, bankruptcy costs and information is available for everyone in the market.  
Modigliani and Miller (1958), in other words, asserted that financing decisions of firms are 
undertaken with identical interest rate and without tax.  As a result, cost of equity is same 
for  firms  which  are,  both,  leveraged  and  non-leveraged.    For  the  non-leveraged  firm, 
premium is included for financial risk. Ultimately, these assumptions are pointing out that 
value of the firm is independent to its capital structure.  
1.1.2 Trade-Off Theory 
Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958)  argument  that  capital  structure  does  not  exist  in  perfect 
market is irrelevant as in real world, imperfections in market is apparent.  This weakness is 
addressed in trade off  theory. It is based on  firm’s choice of source of financing after 
equating  the  cost  and  benefits  of  each  of  the  source,  i.e.  marginal  costs  and  marginal 
benefits (Frank & Goyal, 2003). The balancing of both  aspects determines the optimal 
capital  structure  (Seifert  &  Gonenc,  2008).  The  tradeoff  theory  states  that  a  taxable 
corporation should increase its debt level until its tax advantages of borrowing against the 
costs of financial distress is balanced. Debt level is expected to be increased to the limit 
where marginal value of tax shield is equal or lesser to present value of possible financial 
distress costs (Delcoure, 2007).   
The theory, deemed static, designed  under presumption that optimal capital structure is 
achieved when advantage of the tax shield benefits of debt is equal to increased likelihood 
of incurring debt-related bankruptcy costs (Beattie et al., 2006).  Thus, firm’s debt position 
should be at the level where the tax advantages of additional debt are equal or more of the 
costs of possible financial distress (Myres, 2001). However, debt financing is exposed to 
default risk that points towards probability of bankruptcy. Hence, firm should weigh these 
two aspects in deciding its optimal capital structure level.   
1.1.3 Pecking Order Theory 
 
In pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) the asymmetric information element is included. The 
pecking order hypothesis describes a hierarchy of financial choices for a firm, which starts 
from internally generated financing to debt and lastly outside equity (Seifert & Gonenc, 
2008). Pecking order theory  suggest that  management  would prefer equity financing in 




transactions costs. Based on this theory, highly profitable firms will tend to use internal 
funding, whereas firms with low profitability tend to use external financing. In the context 
of internal finance, the theory indicated internal fund such as retained earnings is preferred 
and as for external financing, debt is chosen over equity (Tang & Jang, 2007). The theory 
can be related to few aspects like agency costs, taxes, transaction costs and information 
asymmetries (Seifert & Gonenc, 2008).   
The theory asserts opposite relationship between profitability and debt usage (Tang & Jang, 
2007). If a firm use of external financing would indicate that the firm is not profitable, its 
stock price may be adversely affected. This related to information asymmetric where the 
managers usually have more information on the firm. Therefore, they  would issue new 
shares when it is believed that the stock price is fairly or overly priced only.  
Information  asymmetric  also  occurs  when  external  financing  signals  the  firm’s  red 
profitability, which may affect the share price. Hence, new shares would be issued only 
when stock price of the firm is deemed favorable. This may again be wrongly interpreted as 
the firm is not profitable and sourcing for external financing. Therefore, debt would be used 
first  instead  of  new  stock  issuance  for  financing  requirement.  Large  cash  reserves  and 
availability of financial slack are resultants of this type of corporate practice (Seifert & 
Gonenc, 2008).    
Besides in information asymmetric, easy access to internal fund and lesser transaction costs 
are reasons for utilization of internal fund first before debt financing (Chen, 2004). It is also 
argued that profitable firms borrow less for the reason that they have their own internal 
fund to be use first (Myres, 2001). The theory also does not back optimal capital structure 
as it is believed to be dynamic over time (Romano et al., 2001).  Nevertheless, in long run, 
firms are expected to identify their capital structure that is consistent with tradeoff models 
of capital structure choice (Hovakimian et al., 2001).   
 
1.1.4 Agency Cost Theory 
Tang  and  Jang  (2007)  reviewed  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976)  that  agency  cost  theory 
induces positive relationship between level of debt and shareholders’ value. There are two 
forms  of  agency  conflicts;  manager-shareholders  and  creditors-shareholders,  where  the 
conflict  between  manager  and  shareholders  is  about  fulfilling  the  respective  parties’ 
individual interest.  For example, managers in profitable firms use equity financing given 
the  availability  of  free  cash  flow.  Hence,  the  managers  are  not  committed  to  debt-
repayment.  This  would potentially reduce the shareholders value (Tang  & Jang, 2007).  
Thus, debt financing is identified as tool to ensure that managers increase shareholders' 
value instead of making money for themselves (Chen, 2004).     
1.1.5 Signaling Hypothesis Model 
Signaling hypothesis model states that high-value firms are able to use more debt financing 
because debt has its dead weight costs, which make less valuable companies more likely to 
fall  into  bankruptcy  –  hence  predicts  that  the  firms  with  the  best  earnings  and  growth 
prospects will employ the most leverage.  This model states the firm with higher value 
would use more debt as it has less probability of being insolvent – hence suggesting that 
firms with high growth rate and large size would resort in debt financing (Chen, 2004). 
However, alternative argument states negative relationship between growth and leverage in 
view of the fact that growth opportunities cannot be collaterized (Lang et al., 1996).  Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 14, Issue 1, 2011 
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1.2 Determinants of Capital Structure 
It  is  always  the  level  of  capital  structure  that  maximizes  the  value  of  the  firm  that  is 
regarded as optimal capital structure (Eriotis et al., 2007). However, existence of optimal 
capital structure level still remains vague with no proper methodology specified to ascertain 
the said level of capital structure based on individual firm’s financial standing. Consequent 
to those theories, there were continuous studies made in relation to factors that determine 
the capital structure of firms.  
1.2.1 Financial Characteristics and Capital Structure 
Financial characteristics of the firm are expected to be the main determinants of capital 
structure. Firm-specific factors like firm size, risk, growth, tangibility and profitability has 
been tested widely across various nations and noted to be significant and consistent with 
capital structure theories (Jong et al., 2008).   
Size of firm is one most common variable used to be tested as explanatory factor for capital 
structure.  Trade-off theory lays down that large firms are expected to have a higher debt 
capacity given the fact that large firms tend to be well diversified and has lesser probability 
to  be  financially  distressed  which  may  lead  to  insolvency  and  bankruptcy  cost 
(Nivorozhkin,  2005).  As  a  firm  becomes  more  diversified,  the  exposure  to  higher 
transactional  costs  and  bankruptcy  cost  reduces  (Chen,  2004).  Hence,  these  firms  are 
expected  to  have  more  inclination  towards  debt  financing.  This  was  concurred  in  past 
studies by Gaud et al. (2005); Arslan and Karan (2006); Huang and Song (2006); Delcoure, 
(2007) and Mitton (2008). Therefore, the hypothesis would be as follows:-    
H1A: There is positive relationship between size of firm and debt ratio 
Pecking order theory suggests firms will use retained earnings before taking up debt and 
external equity (Huang and Song, 2006). Thus, firms would keep debt financing as last 
choice resulting in negative relationship between growth of firm and debt ratio. Agency 
cost also plays important effect on financial decision for high growth firm. Equity financing 
would be sought to undertake new projects instead of debt financing by firms with high 
growth opportunities as a mechanism to minimize agency costs (Jong et al., 2008). Firms 
with high-growth opportunity resort for debt as last option, hence leverage is expected to be 
negatively related with growth (Huang & Song, 2006). As in trade-off theory, firms with 
good growth opportunities has less probability to borrow based on growth opportunities as 
it cannot be used as collateral in borrowing – hence would resort for equity financing (Gaud 
et al., 2005). Asset substitution effect may cause high growth firms to capitalize from debt 
holders  to  shareholders,  hence  firms  to  rely  on  equity  financing  more  (Chen,  2004). 
Upward stock price movement is usually associated with improved growth opportunities, 
which at the end would result in lower debt ratio (Hovakimian et al., 2001). Fattouh et al. 
(2005) and Delcoure (2007) have also concluded in their respective studies that growth is 
negatively related with leverage. As a result, the hypothesis is developed as follows: - 
H1B: There is negative relationship between growth of firm and debt ratio  
Profitability of companies has a uniform negative and significant effect on leverage across 
all  countries  considered,  which  is  in  line  with  the  pecking-order  theory  of  finance 
(Nivorozhkin, 2005). Pecking order theory states that profitable firms would tend to use 
internal funds to finance their expansions (Tang & Jang, 2007). Additionally, the profitable 
firms choose to commit debt for the same reason that their future profits would be subject 
to  terms  and  conditions  by  the  lenders  –thus  resulting  in  inverse  relation  between 




incurring  excessive  tax,  tax-based  models  recommends  profitable  firms  should  borrow 
more and incur interest cost, instead (Huang and Song, 2006). Nevertheless, this is again 
has to be weighed against the expected bankruptcy costs. Study by (Deesomsak et al., 2004) 
revealed that Malaysian firms prefer to use internal sources of funding when profits are 
high, hence showing negative and significant relationship with leverage. Study by Gaud et 
al.  (2005),  Chen  (2004)  and  Booth  et  al.  (2001)  also  revealed  statistically  significant 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage. With this, the hypothesis would 
structures as the following:- 
H1C: There is negative relationship between profitability of firm and debt ratio 
The liquidity level of the firm is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. It indicates 
the ability of the firm to pay creditors in the short-term (Manos et al., 2007). Liquidity are 
expected to have negative relationship as firms tend to use the extra cash to finance their 
investment instead of incurring interest costs (Deesomsak et al., 2004). Additional debt 
would deteriorate the current ratio furthers and makes the firm’s financial standing weak 
(Eriotis et al., 2007). Similarly, increases in cash refer to increase in current assets that 
result in high current ratio. Hence this shows higher liquidity available to finance growth as 
argued in pecking order theory (Hovakimian et al., 2001). The hypothesis would be as 
follows: -   
H1D: There is negative relationship between liquidity level and debt ratio 
In  assessing  the  credit  application  by  firms,  banking  and  financial  institutions  give 
paramount importance to ability of firm to service debt obligations, which is reflected in the 
firm’s interest coverage ratio. Similar to the liquidity measure, the interest coverage also 
expected to have negative relationship with debt ratio. Past studies that have tested this 
relationship are Harris and Raviv (1990), Eriotis et al. (2007) and Manos et al. (2007) who 
found  that  there  is  a  negative  relation  between  the  debt  ratio  of  the  firms  and  interest 
coverage ratio. Hence, the hypothesis developed would be as follows: - 
H1E: There is negative relationship between interest coverage and debt ratio 
 
1.2.2  Family Ownership and Capital Structure 
Ownership  concentration  is  able  to  minimize  agency  conflicts  of  firms  and  maximizes 
firms’  value  via  capital  structure  decisions  (Driffield,  2007).  Hence,  it  is  important  to 
recognize how ownership structure is influencing the capital structure of public listed firms 
in Malaysia.  According to Tam and Tan (2007), listed companies in Malaysia are  still 
within the control of the promoters who still has close relationship with the management of 
these  companies.  In  relation  to  family  owned  companies,  they  defined  that  family 
encompasses  both  individual  and  family  investors,  who  shares  same  organizational 
motivations. Agency cost literature argues that large shareholders should have enhanced 
incentives  and  capabilities  to  monitor  managerial  behavior  closely.  At  most  times,  the 
owners  themselves  act  as  managers.  Thus,  there  is  less  need  for  debt  to  function  as 
disciplining tool for managers. Therefore, shareholdings of family ownership are expected 
to  be  negatively  correlated  with  leverage  (Zou  &  Xiao,  2006).  Family  legacy  and 
concentration  of  family  wealth  in  the  business  also  causes  family-owned  to  have  less 
appetite  for  debt  financing  (King  &  Santor,  2008). This also  supports  the  argument  of 
negative relationship between family-owned firms and leverage. This brings to hypothesis 
as follows:  




2.  Methodolody 
 
2.1 Model Specification 
Dependent variable in this study is capital structure, which is measured by debt ratio.  The 
independent variables, which are the explanatory variables, are classified into two main 
groups. The first independent variable is financial characteristics of the firm.  This variable 
is measured by the firm’s size, growth, profitability, liquidity and interest coverage.  The 
second  independent  variable  is  ownership  structure  of  the  firm  measured  by  family 
ownership. Hence, the model to be used in this study is as follows: - 
Debt Rati o= ƒ {SIZEI, GROWI, PROFI, LIQDI, ATSDI, FAMOI,} + αI + єI  (1) 
where; 
SIZEI  =  size of firm  
GROWI =  growth of firm 
PROFI  =   profitability of firm 
LIQDI  =   liquidity of firm 
ATSDI  =   ability to service debt 
FAMOI  =   family-owned firm 
αI  =   beta   
єI  =    error terms 
This study uses data retrieved from Datastream and Annual Reports of Malaysian public 
listed companies for the period from 2001 to 2006  Periods after year 2000 considered as 
stable after Asian financial crisis as significant restructuring of the economy has taken place 
prior to this period (Chang & Shin, 2007). Lim et al. (2008) reviewed study on Malaysia by 
Cheong et al. (2007) that classified post-crisis period as January 2001 onwards. Unit of 
analysis would be public listed companies.         
In this study,  firms listed on Industrial Products portfolio of the Main Board of Bursa 
Malaysia are selected as sample.  Industrial Product portfolio is selected as sample given its 
prominence contribution to Malaysia economy.  Based on Bank Negara Report, Industrial 
portfolio  consists  mainly  by  firms  that  are  involved  in  manufacturing  activities,  which 
contributes  30.3%  of  the  Malaysia’s  GDP  or  equivalent  to  RM152,390  million  in  year 
2007.  During the 1997 financial crisis, industrial sector was also badly hit.  In February 
1998, the industrial and manufacturing output contracted by 3.4% and 4.3% respectively in 
the first quarter of 1999 (Ariff & Yanti, 1999).  As firms in these industries are listed on 
Industrial Product sector, it would be more relevant to study the capital structure of firms in 
this portfolio.  Industrial Product portfolio in Main Board is comprised of 152 firms.  
All the variables with its proxy for measurement and past empirical studies are summarized 
below.     




Table 1. Variables Descriptions 
Variable  Proxy for Measurement  Past Studies 
Size of Firm (SIZE)  Logarithm of Total Assets 
Huang and Song (2006) 
Delcoure (2007) 
Mitton (2008) 
Growth (GROW)  Sales Growth 
Chen (2004) 
Fattouh et al. (2005) 
Gaud et al. (2005) 
Profitability (PROF)  EBIT 
Total Assets 
Booth et al. (2001) 
Zou and Xiao (2006) 
Jong et al. (2008) 
Liquidity (LIQD)  Current Assets 
Current Liabilities 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) 
Eriotis et al. (2007) 
Manos, et al. (2007) 




Harris and Raviv (1990) 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) 
Eriotis et al. (2007) 
Family Owned 
(FAMO) 
More than 5% owned by 
individual and/or family 
members 
Zou and Xiao (2006)  
King and Santor (2008) 
 
In order to obtain the data on family ownership of the firm, annual reports of all targeted 
firms were downloaded from Bursa Malaysia website.  The said information is available 
under Shareholders Statistics section in every Annual Report.  The substantial shareholders 
are determined from the Substantial Shareholders sub-section, where in this section firms 
are regulated to list name and percentage of shareholdings of shareholders who has more 
than  5%  interest  in  the  firm  (Tam  &  Tan,  2007).   5%  cut-off  is  used  in  to  determine 
substantial ownership as most of previous studies has used 5% given its clarity purposes 
(Zuo & Xiao, 2006). Using a dummy variable, family ownership is recognized if substantial 
shareholders are family members that cumulatively owned more than 5% interest in the 
firm.   
2.2 Data Analysis 
Panel (data) analysis was used in this study given its ability to estimate the relationship 
between  debt  ratio  and  determinants  of  capital  structure.  Panel  data  analysis  has  three 
approaches,  i.e.  independently  pooled  panels,  fixed  effect  models  and  random  effect 
models.  The choice of approach to be used differs according to objective of the study. In 
this study, fixed effect model is used given the objective of this study to determine the 
relationship between variables of firms over a period of five years. Fixed effect model is 
divided into two sub-models, i.e. cross-effect model and time-effect model.  In cross-effect 
model, the firm differences are controlled, whereas in time-effect model, time differences 
are  controlled.  Another  model  that  has  been  used  is  the  two  way-effect  model,  which 
controls both firm and time differences.   Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 14, Issue 1, 2011 
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3.  Results 
Preliminary analysis is first undertaken for dependent and first independent variable, which 
are firm-specific financial characteristics.  In the analysis, all three types of leverages, i.e. 
overall leverage, long-term leverage and short-term leverage were calculated.  However, 
the result showed that differences between all three leverage were insignificant.  Hence, 
only ratio of overall leverage was used in final estimation.   
Correlation  analysis  is  undertaken  to  ensure  that  there  is  no  multicollinearity  among 
variables tested.  Firstly, correlation between the dependent and independent variables for 
firm-specific  financial  characteristics  were  determined.    From  Table  2,  the  output  of 
analysis showed that there was low correlation between debt and firm-specific financial 
characteristics variables.  The lowest value is observed in growth and followed by ability to 
service  debt,  size  and  liquidity.  Thus,  it  is  noticeable  that  there  is  no  issue  of 
multicollinearity among the  variables, both dependent and independent in the empirical 
model.  
Table 2. Results of Correlation Analysis & Descriptive Analysis 
Panel I: Correlation Analysis 
  DEBT  SIZE  PROF  LIQD  GROW  ATSD  
DEBT  1  -0.0187  -0.4452  -0.1618  0.00378  -0.0481 
SIZE    1  0.0979  -0.1457  0.0179  -0.0280 
PROFIT      1  0.2391  -0.0650  0.1147 
LIQUIDITY         1  0.0049  0.0344 
GROWTH           1  -0.0107 
ABILITY            1 
Panel II: Descriptive analysis 
  DEBT  SIZE  PROF  LIQD  GROW  ATSD  
 Mean   0.2719   12.7110   0.0498   3.1394   1.6472   2.6629 
 Std. Dev.   0.6540   1.2992   0.1408   5.4455   29.098   30.816 
No of firms = 107  Family-owned firms = 75 
The analysis started by using the three models or procedures of panel analysis that were 
mentioned in earlier chapter. Inferring from the outcome of the analysis as shown in Table 
3, the best procedure that was chosen to be used to estimate the empirical model is cross-
effect procedure.   
The existence of valid model is apparent in all three procedures as F-statistic suggests that 
all  models  are  valid  at  1%  significant  level.  However,  other  criteria  were  taken  into 
consideration  to  underline  the  suitability  of  cross-effect  procedure.  Among  three 
procedures, cross-effect and two-way effect had higher explanatory power which is above 
40% compared to time-effect that had only merely 20% explanatory power. Thus, nearly 
40% of the debt ratio has been significantly explained by the five independent variables in 




Secondly,  standard  error  of  regression  was  used  to  evaluate  in  order  to  obtain  best 
procedure. The standard error of regression demonstrated that both procedures had same 
value. Thirdly, Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC) was used, where cross-effect procedure 
noted to have the lowest – hence the better one compared to two-way effect. The Durbin-
Watson Test value of 2.05 indicated that there is no autocorrelation as it is in the range of 
1.50 to 2.50.  In precise, it was deduced that cross-effect model is the most suitable model 
to be used to estimate the empirical model in this study. 
Table 3. Estimated Panel Analysis 
Panel I: Estimated Model 
  Pooled  Time-Effect  Cross-Effect  Two-Way Effect 
CONSTAN  0.2601  0.2471  1.1882  1.1403** 









































Panel II: Model Criteria 
  Pooled  Time-Effect  Cross-Effect  Two-Way Effect 
R
2  0.2023  0.2060  0.4934  0.4966 
Adjusted-R
2  0.1942  0.1914  0.4085  0.4085 
S.E. of Reg.  0.3505  0.3510  0.2442  0.2442 








SIC  0.8036  0.8487  1.1296  1.1690 
D-W Stat  0.9399  0.9329  2.0478  2.0485 
Note: Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significant at 10%, 5 % and 1% critical values, 
respectively.   
Figure in ( ) stands for t-value and in [ ] represents p-value 
 
Ownership  structure  is  the  second  independent  variable  included  as  focal  point  of  this 
study.  However, out of 107 firms included as sample, 70% of the firms are family-owned.  
This has caused inclusion of other structure i.e. state-owned and foreign-owned variables 
providing insignificant result on the model.  Hence, only family-owned proxy by a dummy 
variable is included in the final empirical model of this study. Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 14, Issue 1, 2011 
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The cross-effect procedure is maintained to test the ownership structure variable.  From 
Table  3,  goodness  of  fit  as  measured  by  R
2 and  adjusted-R
2  shows  more  than  60%  of 
dependent variables are explained by the independent variable. Standard error of regression 
is low and Durbin-Watson value is within acceptable range. The model is valid as reflected 
in F test.   
Basing on data from Model Criteria of Panel II from Table 3 and Table 4, it is obvious that 
dependent variables are better explained by the independent variable which is measured by 
comparing goodness of fit test. The R
2 and adjusted-R
2 of the second model in higher, i.e. 
more than 60%, compared to the first one which explained only 40% of the independent 
variables.  
The second model that used both firm financial characteristics and ownership structure is a 
better model compared to the one that used only firm financial characteristics.  Thus, in this 
study,  empirical  model  which  has  both  firm  financial  characteristics  and  ownership 
structure would be used.  From this model which is derived after inclusion of FAMO, it is 
apparent that SIZE, which was negatively related with DEBT at 1% significant level earlier 
changed to positive relationship with DEBT at 10% significant level.  This is in accordance 
to the past literature review i.e. Gaud et al. (2005); Arslan and Karan (2006); Huang and 
Song (2006); Delcoure, (2007) and Mitton (2008).  Influence of family ownership in the 
form of negotiation for lower transaction cost incurred by large firm was possibly among 
the reasons for the positive relationship between SIZE and DEBT after inclusion of FAMO.  
Hence, this study supports the hypothesis that there is positive relationship between size of 
firm and debt ratio. 
Relationship of DEBT and GROW remain insignificant. Therefore, this study rejects the 
hypothesis that there is negative relationship between growth of firm and debt ratio. The 
practical inference that could be made from this result is that the time horizon used for this 
study. The post year 2000 has been a rough period for business fraternity in the region 
(Tam  &  Tan,  2007).  Negative  effect  from  September  11  attack,  Afghanistan  and  Iraq 
invasion and SARS epidemic might directly and indirectly affected the business sentiment 
which procrastinated with growth rate of individual firms (Mitton, 2002; Deesomsak et al., 
2004). Thus, limited growth opportunities had failed to have significant effect on debt of 
local firms. 
It  is  apparent  that  PROF  remains  with  negative  relationship  at  1%  significant  level  as 
estimated earlier without the FAMO variable.  Thus, this study accepts the hypothesis that 
there is negative relationship between profitability of firm and debt ratio. It is consistent 
with studies by Booth et al. (2001), Chen (2004), Gaud et al. (2005) and Deesomsak et. al, 
2004. Aftermath of the crisis,  many public listed  firms tightened their belt in terms  of 
borrowings.  This  may  additionally  explain  the  negative  relationship  between  debt  and 
profitability of firms used in this study. 
 




Table 4.Estimated Panel Analysis- The Impact of Family-Owned Firm 
 
                  Panel I: Estimated Model 
  Cross-Effect 
CONSTANT  0.0598 
SIZE   0.0195*** 
(3.8537) 
GROW  -0.0001 
(-1.8352) 
PROF  0.7695*** 
(-14.9317) 









                    Panel II: Model Criteria 
R
2  0.6408  S.E. of regression  0.2261 
Adjusted R
2  0.6339  Durbin-Watson stat  2.0253 
F-statistic        64.6381 (0.0000)   
Note 
  Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significant at 10%, 5 % and 1% critical values, 
respectively.   
  Figure in ( ) stands for t-value and in [ ] represents p-value 
 
Interesting point of this study is the indirect impact of FAMO on DEBT via LIQD and 
ATSD. These two variables were estimated with negative relationship with DEBT at 1% 
significant  level  after  the  inclusion  of  FAMO  variable  in  the  empirical  equation.  
Explanation to these changes in the relationship can be associated with influence of family 
ownership. Controlling stake by family would result in no separation of ownership and 
control in these firms.  Hence, the shareholders themselves would act as the managers – 
causing the absence of agency cost problem.  Borrowing would not be preferred if the 
firms’ liquidity level is good as the owners probably intends to avoid high interest expense. 
With this, in this study, the hypothesis that state there is negative relationship between 
liquidity level and debt ratio is accepted. This is in line with the argument by Deesomsak et. 
al. (2004). Similarly,  the hypothesis that there is  negative relationship between interest 
coverage and debt ratio is also accepted which was also indicated by Harris and Raviv 
(1990), Eriotis et al. (2007) and Manos et al. (2007).     
FAMO has negative relationship with DEBT as reckoned in literature review.  However, 
this was not proven at any significant level.  This could be related to the fact that bank’s 
lending practices has changed drastically after the 1997 financial crisis, where character or Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 14, Issue 1, 2011 
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name lending is no more an element in bank’s credit decisions.  Importance is given to 
financial standing, past track record in banking relationship and feasibility of the purpose of 
lending.  Hence,  family  ownership  of  firm  possibly  has  no  direct  impact  on  the  firm’s 
capital structure, though the relationship is presumed to be negative.   
 
Conclusion and Direction for Future Research 
This  study  had  shed  some  light  on  prevalent  capital  structure  trend  of  public  listed 
companies in Malaysia.  One of last study conducted pertaining same purpose in Malaysia 
had  concluded  ownership  structure  ownership  concentration  mitigated  conflict  between 
managers and owners (Suto, 2003).  However, in this study, family ownership structure had 
little  direct  significance  on  capital  structure.  Nevertheless,  it  had  affected  the  other 
independent variables, namely liquidity and ability to service debt, to have significant effect 
on capital structure.  Hence, concentrated ownership has effect on the way the companies 
decide on their financing methods to be aligned with prudent and sensible reasoning.  This 
is important as pre-crisis period was plagued with negligent practice that led to collapse of 
large conglomerates.   
The result of this study together with that of Suto (2003), Zuo and Xiao (2006) and King 
and Santor (2008) had similar supposition that concentrated ownership, in this case family 
ownership, had direct or indirect effect on capital structure decisions of firms.  This shows 
that corporate governance dimension in terms of ownership structure is also one of the 
factors that affect capital structure of local public listed companies. This can be inferred as 
improvement  compared  to  the  situation  before  1997  financial  crisis,  where  corporate 
governance was considered as weak link in corporate environment (Tam and Tan 2007). 
Thus, this study is important in understanding the change in trend of local public listed 
companies in their financing behavior.    
As for other studies, this one also carries its limitations. Firstly, the sample chosen is only 
from  Industrial  Product  sector  of  Main  Board  of  Bursa Malaysia.  Secondly,  ownership 
structure for this study  was only confined to family-owned, instead of state-owned and 
foreign-owned. This was because the Industrial Product sector of Main Board of Bursa 
Malaysia has less representation from state-owned and foreign-owned. Therefore, the effect 
of having owners from these institutions in decision pertaining to capital structure was not 
able to be identified.  In determining the ownership structure, dummy variables were used 
to differentiate the type of ownership.  Due to limitation in data and access to information, 
the exact percentage of the  ownership  was  not being able to be included in the  study. 
Finally, some other independent variables identified in recent literature were not able to be 
included in this study such as tax-effect and stock price movement. Main reasons for this 
were inadequate access to the data and complication is compiling these data.  Thus, certain 
interesting elements were not being able to be highlighted.   
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